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Abstract
J. Hopcroft and D. Sheldon originally introduced network reputation
games to investigate the self-interested behavior of web authors who want
to maximize their PageRank on a directed web graph by choosing their
outlinks in a game theoretic manner. They give best response strategies
for each player and characterize properties of web graphs which are Nash
equilibria. In this paper we consider three different models for PageRank
games on undirected graphs such as certain social networks. In undirected
graphs players may delete links at will, but typically cannot add links
without the other player’s permission. In the deletion-model players are
free to delete any of their bidirectional links but may not add links. We
study the problem of determining whether the given graph represents a
Nash equilibrium or not in this model. We give an O(n2) time algorithm
for a tree, and a parametric O(2kn4) time algorithm for general graphs,
where k is the maximum vertex degree in any biconnected component
of the graph. In the request-delete-model players are free to delete any
bidirectional links and add any directed links, since these additions can
be done unilaterally and can be viewed as requests for bidirected links. For
this model we give an O(n3) time algorithm for verifying Nash equilibria in
trees. Finally, in the add-delete-model we allow a node to make arbitrary
deletions and the addition of a single bidirectional link if it would increase
the page rank of the other player also. In this model we give a parametric
algorithm for verifying Nash equilibria in general graphs and characterize
so called α-insensitive Nash Equilibria. We also give a result showing
a large class of graphs where there is an edge addition that causes the
PageRank of both of its endpoints to increase, suggesting convergence
towards complete subgraphs.
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1 Introduction
Introduced by Larry Page and Sergey Brin [13], the PageRank of a web page
is an important basis of the Google search engine and possibly one of the most
successful applications of a mathematical concept in the IT world. PageRank is
a value that is assigned to each web page according to the stationary distribution
of an α-random walk on the web graph. Here an α-random walk is a random
walk modified to make a random jump with probability α at each step and a
random jump is a move to a node according to a given distribution vector q.
Unlike rankings based on content such as keywords, tags, etc., PageRank
focuses solely on the hyperlink structure of the given web graph. Web links
themselves possess strategic worth and hence web authors often try to boost
the PageRank of their web pages by carefully choosing links to other pages.
Since these authors behave strategically in a self-interested way, this is a typical
example of a non-cooperative game. In fact, Hopcroft and Sheldon recently
introduced the PageRank game as a game theoretic model played over a directed
graph [6]. Each player is identified with a node, and a strategy is a specification
of a set of outlinks to other nodes. The payoff for each player is the PageRank
value for their node which is calculated on the resulting directed graph. The
obvious goal of each player is to maximize their payoff.
In [6], the authors proved a nice property of this game, namely the best
strategy of a player v is to place her outlinks to the nodes u having largest
potential value φuv. The potential φuv measures the probability of returning to
v before the first jump and does not depend on the outlinks from v if the other
nodes do not change their outlinks. Thus, a simple greedy algorithm exists for
deciding if a given graph is in Nash equilibrium and a nice characterization of
Nash equilibria graphs is possible. Interestingly, it turns out that such graphs
representing Nash equilibria have very strong regularity properties (see Section 3
for details). The purpose of this paper is to study similar problems on undirected
graphs.
Motivation. Social networks have become one of the defining paradigms
of our time, with enormous influence on how decisions are taken and events
unfold. As with web graphs, content by itself will rarely be enough to explain the
dynamics of these networks. The underlying graph structure itself surely plays a
role in how new relations are formed and old relations broken. In considering two
major social networks, Facebook and Twitter, a casual glance shows a radically
different graph structure in spite of the fact that they have a comparable number
of similar users. Facebook, an undirected graph, has few nodes with degree more
than a 1000. Twitter, a directed graph, has nodes (such as Kate Perry) with
in-degree 28 million and out degree just 115. A basic difference in the dynamics
of the two networks is edge addition, which requires the approval of both nodes
in an undirected graph but does not in a directed graph. The ability to add
and delete links instantly in a directed network allows for an extremely rapid
dynamically changing graph structure. Anecdotal evidence points to a much
more stable graph structure in Facebook which apparently consists of large
number of relatively small very dense subgraphs.
Another example of an undirected network is the graph of international bi-
lateral agreements between universities. We might consider PageRank as mea-
suring how prestigious a university is, and universities might only accept agree-
ments if it increases their prestige. Finally we might consider the coauthorship
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Figure 1: Edge deletion
graph, possibly one of the oldest social networks, defined so that people could
find their “Erdos number”. Here edge deletions are not permitted, but edge
additions could conceivably be influenced by the PageRank of the given nodes.
Our motivation is to build models for undirected graphs and to study their
dynamics. Our basic tool will be to adopt PageRank as a quantity that users
try to optimize. Under this assumption we will study how undirected networks
evolve, what networks in equilibrium look like, and contrast this to the case of
directed networks. Whether users of these networks actually behave in this way
is beyond the scope of this paper.
Outline of the paper. We introduce three different models for PageRank
games on undirected graphs. Our study mainly focuses on the deletion-model
(described in Section 3) where a player cannot create a new link but may unilat-
erally delete an existing one. In the directed web graph model described above,
what v intuitively does is to cut its links to nodes u having smaller φuv values,
assuming that u will not delete its edge to v. In the deletion-model, if v cuts
its outlink to u we assume that u also cuts its outlink to v either automatically,
or as a form of revenge. In Figure 1 deleting edge ae increases e’s PageRank
but decreases a’s. So e may unilaterally choose to do this. Note after the edge
deletion, if a proposed to reinstate the edge e would refuse.
Unlike the directed graph model, in the undirected model a node cannot
add a new edge by acting unilaterally, but must seek the permission of the
other node of the edge. It turns out that the class of equilibria graphs in the
deletion-model is larger than in the directed model. Unfortunately, the nice
property of the original model that φuv does not depend on the outlinks from
v, no longer holds. Hence the greedy algorithm for the Nash decision problem
does not work, either, and there seems to be no obvious way of checking the
equilibrium condition.
In Section 3.1 we give an O(n2) time algorithm for the case where the graph
is a tree. In Section 3.2 we gave a parametric algorithm for general graphs, where
the parameter k is the maximum degree of any vertex in any biconnected com-
ponent that contains it. Biconnected components roughly correspond to local
clusters of web pages, where one could expect the parameter k to be relatively
small. Nodes linking biconnected clusters may have arbitrarily large degree
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Figure 2: Edge addition
without changing the time complexity. We give an O(2kn4) time algorithm for
general graphs.
Our second model is the request-delete-model where a player can unilater-
ally delete any existing edges and also can unilaterally create any new directed
outlinks but cannot create a new inlink. In Section 4, we give an O(n3) time
algorithm for trees which determines if the given graph is a Nash equilibrium
in request-delete-models. It draws on the algorithm in Section 3.1.
The third model is called the add-delete-model where a player can delete
any existing edges and also can add an undirected edge to another player if the
PageRank of both players are improved. In Figure 2 adding edge bf increases
both b’s and f ’s PageRank, so both parties would accept this addition. Note
the PageRank of all other players decreases.
While it may seem a great restriction to consider single edge additions,
recall that we are interested in Nash equilibria. Multiple edge additions require
the simultaneous decisions of multiple players. A player in this group cannot
know the actions of the other players and hence cannot predict the new graph
structure. Therefore it is not possible in general for a player to calculate whether
or not an edge addition would improve her PageRank. In Section 5, we give an
O(22kn5) time algorithm for general graphs which determines if the given graph
is a Nash equilibrium in add-delete-models. It draws on the algorithm in Section
3.2. We also give two structural type theorems. The first shows that the only
α-insensitive equilibria are complete graphs. The second says that in symmetric
graphs edge-addition will occur. This gives some theoretical justification for the
anecdotal evidence cited earlier with respect to Facebook.
Our results begin with the study of trees. This is not because social networks
are likely to be trees but because the more complex parametric algorithms for
general graphs are based on these results.
Related work. Although it focuses less on game theoretic aspects, there
is a large literature on optimal linking strategies to maximize the PageRank
of given nodes for directed graphs. On the positive side, Avrachenkov and
Litvak [2] give a polynomial-time algorithm for maximizing the PageRank of a
single node by selecting its outlinks. Kerchove et. al. [7] extend this result to
maximizing the sum of the PageRank of a given set of nodes. Csaji et. al. [4]
4
give a polynomial-time algorithm for maximizing the PageRank of a single node
with any given set of controllable links.
On the negative side, [4] also shows that the problem becomes NP-hard if
some pairs of controllable links in the set are mutually exclusive. Olsen [9]
proved that maximizing the minimum PageRank in the given set of nodes is
NP-hard if we are allowed to add k new links. He also proved that the problem
is still NP-hard if we restrict the node set to a single node and the k links to
only incoming ones to that node [10] and gives a constant factor approximation
algorithm for this problem [11]. The question of whether there are α-sensitive
Nash equilibria was recently affirmatively answered by Chen et. al. [3].
This paper is an extended version of an earlier paper presented at ISAAC
2011 [1], which only covered the edge deletion model.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 PageRank values
Initially we describe the Hopcroft-Sheldon directed graph model. Let D =
(V,E′) be a simple directed graph on node set V and arc set E′, and let q be a
probability distribution on V . Throughout the paper we let n = |V | denote the
number of nodes. For v ∈ V , let Γ(v) denote the set of v’s out-neighbours. A
random jump is a move to a node according to the distribution vector q instead
of using one of the outlinks of the current node. An α-random walk on D is a
random walk that is modified to make a random jump with fixed probability
α (0 < α < 1) at each step. The PageRank vector pi over the n vertices in V
is defined as the stationary distribution of the α-random walk. We define the
potential matrix Φ = (φuv) such that for vertices u, v ∈ V , φuv is the probability
that a random walk that starts from u visits v before the first random jump
(φuv = 1 if u = v), which can be written as
φuv =
1− α
|Γ(u)|
∑
i∈Γ(u)
φiv. (1)
In order to calculate pi, we have the following equation [6]:
piv = α
∑
u∈V quφuv
1− (1−α)|Γ(v)|
∑
i∈Γ(v) φiv
. (2)
Chen et. al. proved that piv is continuous for α ∈ (0, 1) [3].
2.2 Directed PageRank games
In the PageRank games in [6] the players are the nodes V of a directed graph
D and they attempt to optimize their PageRank by strategic link placement.
A strategy for node v is a set of outlinks. An outcome is an arc set E′ for D
consisting of the outlinks chosen by each player. The payoff of each player is
the value of PageRank which is calculated on D.
We say a player v is in best response, if v takes a strategy which maximizes v’s
PageRank in D. A directed graph D is a Nash equilibrium if the set of outlinks
for each node is a best response: no player can increase her PageRank value by
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choosing different outlinks. Several results for best response strategies and for
Nash equilibria were introduced in [6]. In particular they gave a characterization
of α-insensitive Nash equilibria, which are graphs being Nash equilibria for all
values 0 < α < 1 of the jump parameter.
In this paper we study PageRank games for undirected graphs. Let G =
(V,E) be an undirected graph on vertex set V and edge set E. Define the
directed graph D = (V,E′) on the same vertex set V , where each edge uv in E
gives rise to two arcs uv and vu in E′. In our model, the payoff of each player
v for the graph G is the PageRank of v in the corresponding directed graph D.
3 Deletion Only Models
In this section, we study the deletion-model for undirected PageRank games,
where a player cannot unilaterally create a bidirected link to another node, but
it can delete a bidirectional link. We consider the problem that determines
whether the given graph is a Nash equilibrium in deletion-model or not. In
Section 3.1 we give a quadratic algorithm for the special case when G is a tree,
and in Section 3.2 we give an O(2kn4)time algorithm for general graphs where
k is the maximum vertex degree on any biconnected component on G.
In the deletion-model, we say that a player v is in best response if v cannot
increase her PageRank by any deletion of her (bidirectional) links. A Nash
equilibrium is a graph for which every player is in best response. We consider
the following problem:
Input: An undirected graph G, α, q.
Output: Is the input a Nash equilibrium? (yes/no)
An equivalent formulation is to decide whether no player can increase her
PageRank for the given input, where she is only allowed to delete edges to her
neighbours. As for directed graphs, we let Γ(v) denote the neighbours of vertex
v in G. A strategy for v is to retain a subset Ev ⊆ Γ(v) of neighbours and delete
edges to her other neighbours. Let x be a 0/1 vector of length dv = |Γ(v)|, which
indicates v’s strategy. Formally, if i ∈ Ev then xi = 1, otherwise xi = 0, for
i = 1, ..., dv. Let φuv(x) denote the potential function (1) for the subgraph
of G formed by deleting edges (v, i), i ∈ Γ(v) − Ev. By (2) applied to the
corresponding directed graph D the PageRank of v can be written as
piv(x) = α
∑
u∈V quφuv(x)
1− (1− α)
∑
i∈Γ(v) φiv(x)xi
1Tx
(3)
where x 6= 0. Let 1m denote a vector of ones of length m. Usually the length is
clear by the context so for simplicity we may drop the subscript m. If the input
is a Nash equilibrium then v is using a best response and no edge deletions for
v will raise her PageRank. Therefore piv(1dv ) ≥ piv(x) for any 0/1 vector x.
The approach we will use to solve the problem described in this section is to
compute the maximum of piv(x) over all 0/1 vectors x of length dv, for each
vertex v.
We give some examples in Figure 3. Graphs (a), (b) are α-insensitive Nash
equilibria in directed PageRank games, and are also a Nash equilibrium in
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deletion-models for any given α and q. Graph (c) is an example which is not
a Nash equilibrium in directed games, since v can increase its PageRank if we
delete the arc from v to 2 which has less potential than 1. However (c) is a
Nash equilibrium in deletion-models for α = 0.15 and uniform distribution q,
since if v cuts its edge to 2 then it decreases v’s PageRank. Graph (d) is not a
Nash equilibrium in both directed models and deletion-models for α = 0.15 and
uniform distribution q, where Km is a m-complete graph, m = 8 for example.
In this graph the potentials from 2, 3 to v are much less than 1, so v may try
to cut the edge to 2 or the edge to 3, but a single edge deletion decreases v’s
PageRank. Interestingly, the deletion of both edges leads to a greater PageRank
for v.
Figure 3: Examples
3.1 Trees
In this section, we study the problem where the graph G is a tree. We prove
the following theorem.
Theorem 3.1 Given a tree G, jump probability α and distribution q, we can
determine in O(n2) time whether G is a Nash equilibrium in the deletion-model
and if not give an improving strategy for at least one player.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem.
Let v be a node in G, let Γ(v) be the set of neighbours of v, and let dv =
|Γ(v)|. Consider any strategy for v as described above and let x be the 0/1
vector that represents it. For i ∈ Γ(v), let Ni be the set of nodes which are
descendants of i (including i itself) in the subtree of G rooted at v. For a node
u ∈ Ni,
φuv(x) = φuvxi, (4)
since potentials of all nodes in Ni depend on only link (v, i) and the other links
of v do not affect these potentials. This is because if v cuts link (v, i), all nodes
in Ni are disconnected from the other nodes in G.
Therefore (3) can be rewritten:
piv(x) = α
∑
i∈Γ(v)
∑
u∈Ni quφuvxi
1− (1− α)
∑
i∈Γ(v) φivxi
1Tx
. (5)
Note that the potential matrix Φ on G can be computed in O(n2) time, by using
Gaussian elimination methods for each column vector (Φ)v defined by equation
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(1). Since G is a tree we can apply elimination steps in post-order, where
we consider v to be the root of G. There are at most n forward eliminations
and backward substitutions because every node except v has only one parent.
Therefore it costs O(n2) time to compute Φ.
Let ai = α
∑
u∈Ni quφuv and let bi = 1 − (1 − α)φiv for i ∈ Γ(v). Consider
the fractional integer programming problem,
P : maximize piv(x) = 1
Tx
aTx
bTx
, x ∈ {0, 1}n
where ai ≥ 0 and bi ≥ 0 for i ∈ Γ(v) are known constants.
In order to solve problem P , we fix the Hamming weight l of x and we solve
the following problem for each l = 1, ..., dv:
Q : maximize f(x) =
aTx
bTx
subject to 1Tx = l.
Problem Q can be solved directly by Megiddo’s method in O(n2 log2 n) time [8],
and it can be also solved by Newton’s Method in time O(n2 log n) [12]. However
we are able to specialize Megiddo’s method for our problem to obtain an O(n2)
time algorithm. Our approach initially follows the technique describe in [8].
Since maxpiv(x) = maxl l f(x), we can solve problem P by solving problem
Q for each l = 1, ..., dv. Consider the following maximization problem for some
fixed δ.
R : maximize g(x) = (a− bδ)Tx subject to 1Tx = l.
Let ci = ai − biδ, i ∈ Γ(v) and let S(δ) be the decreasing sequence of indices
ordered by the values of ci. Problem R is easily solved by choosing the first l
indices in S(δ). Let h(δ) be the optimal value of problem R for a given δ, that
is, h(δ) = max{g(x) : 1Tx = l}. When h(δ) = 0, then δ is equal to δ∗ which is
the optimal value of problem Q. On the other hand, if h(δ) > 0 then δ < δ∗,
and if h(δ) < 0 then δ > δ∗, i. e., a root of h (see Figure 4). The task in solving
problem Q is to find the value δ∗ for which h(δ∗) = 0 by some tests on δ. The
key point is how many values of δ have to be tested for finding δ∗. Since the
optimal solution for R can change only when the order of S(δ) changes, we only
have to test δ at intersection values of lines {ci = ai−biδ : i ∈ Γ(v)}. Using some
results from computational geometry, we are able to do this efficiently. First we
δ*
h(δ)
0 δ
Figure 4: Solving h(δ) = 0
ai-biδ
δ0
Figure 5: Path for l = 3 on H
compute the line arrangement of lines {ci = ai − biδ : i ∈ Γ(v)}. Namely we
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define the planar graph H which is formed by subdivision of the plane induced
by these lines. Then we look all edges in H as directed according to the positive
direction of δ.
For each l we test values of δ at the change point of the lth entry in S(δ),
which are the nodes in H lying on the lth layer of the arrangement. An example
with l = 3 is shown in Figure 5.
We summarize the algorithm for solving P . First compute constants ai, bi,
for i ∈ Γ(v), and line arrangement of lines {ci = ai − biδ : i ∈ Γ(v)}. Compute
S(0) by sorting the values of ai. For l = 1, ..., dv, do following steps: let xi = 1
if i is within lth entry of S(0), and otherwise xi = 0. Compute A = a
Tx and
B = bTx. From the starting edge, which is lth edge from the top, follow the l-th
layer as follows: When we follow the edge on the line ci = ai− biδ, and visit the
node which is intersection of ci = ai− biδ and cj = aj− bjδ, let A← A−ai+aj
and B ← B − bi + bj . If A − Bδ < 0 then output x as the solution, otherwise
let xi ← 0 and xj ← 1, and go to next node by following the edge on the line
cj = aj − bjδ.
Finally, we analyze the running time of the algorithm. Computing the line
arrangement takes O(d2v) time, which is done by the incremental method or
topological sort algorithms (see Edelsbrunner [5]). Since the number of nodes
in H is O(d2v) and each of them is visited twice, we can find δ
∗ for each l in
at most O(d2v) time. Therefore this algorithm solves problem P in O(d
2
v) time.
Note that if v is not in best response the solution to P gives an improving
strategy for v.
As we have seen we can test whether a node v is in best response in O(d2v)
time. Because G is a tree we have
∑
v∈V dv = 2(n−1), and we have
∑
v∈V d
2
v <(∑
v∈V dv
)2
= 4(n − 1)2. Therefore we can test whether all nodes are in best
response in O(n2) time. This concludes the proof of Theorem 3.1.
3.2 General Graphs
In this section we give a parametric algorithm for general connected graphs
based on a parameter k = k(G) defined as follows. If G = (V,E) is a tree we
set k = 1 else k is the maximum vertex degree in any biconnected component
of G. Note that k(G) can be computed in O(|E|) time by decomposing G into
its biconnected components and by finding the maximum vertex degree in every
such component. Note that graphs can have a large maximum vertex degree but
small parameter k. This would occur whenever the large degree vertices were
cut vertices. In a network setting the biconnected components could represent
small groups of well connected web pages with relatively few links per page.
These groups would be linked together by a few pages containing many more
links. We prove the following theorem.
Theorem 3.2 Given a graph G with k = k(G), jump probability α and distri-
bution q, in O(2kn4) time we can determine if this is a Nash Equilibrium in the
deletion-model and if not give an improving strategy for at least one player.
The remainder of this section is devoted to the proof of this theorem.
Let v be a node in G and let {C1, C2, ..., Cd} be the set of connected com-
ponents in the subgraph that is induced by deletion of v from G. It follows
from the definition of k = k(G) that v has at most k links to Ci for i = 1, ..., d.
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Let Ui = {u : u ∈ Ci, u ∈ Γ(v)} indicate the set of v’s neighbours in Ci, for
i = 1, ..., d. We have |Ui| ≤ k by the definition of k. Consider any strategy for
v, as described in Section 3 and let x be the 0/1 vector of length dv = |Γ(v)|
that represents it. We write x = (x1, x2, ..., xd) as the concatenation of the 0/1
vectors xi representing the strategy restricted to the component Ci, i = 1, ..., d.
Then, for u ∈ V , if u ∈ Ci for i = 1, ..., d, the potential of u is written as follows:
φuv(x) =
∑
S⊆Ui
φSuv
∏
s∈S
xis
∏
s∈Uv−S
(1− xis) (6)
where φSuv are the potentials from u for the subgraph of G formed by deleting
edges vu, u ∈ Γ(v) − S. This is because potentials to v from all nodes in Ci
depend only on links to Ui and never depend on other links. To compute each
column vector (Φ)Sv for S ⊆ Ui for i = 1, ..., d, we solve the linear systems
defined on (1) by Gaussian elimination method in O(2kn3) time.
We have the formula for PageRank of v as
piv(x) = 1
Tx
∑
i
∑
S⊆Ui aS
∏
s∈S x
i
s∑
i
∑
S⊆Ui bS
∏
s∈S xis
. (7)
where aS and bS be constants such that
aS =
∑
u∈Ci:S⊆Ci
αqu
∑
T⊆S
(−1)|S|−|T |φTuv (8)
bS =
{
1− (1− α)φSuv S = {u}
−(1− α)∑u∈S∑T⊆S(−1)|S|−|T |φTuv otherwise. (9)
Note that aS ≥ 0 for all S and the denominator of piv(x) is always positive.
In order to determine whether v maximizes its PageRank, consider the fol-
lowing fractional integer programming problem:
P : maximize piv(x), x
i
s ∈ {0, 1} for s ∈ Ui, i = 0, ..., d.
The method for problem P is the similar to that used in Section 3.1. We fix the
Hamming weight of x as 1Tx = l, and consider the following fractional integer
programming problem:
Q : maximize f(x) =
∑
i
∑
S⊆Ui aS
∏
s∈S x
i
s∑
i
∑
S⊆Ui bS
∏
s∈S xis
subject to 1Tx = l.
Since maxpiv(x) = maxl l f(x), we can solve problem P by solving problem Q
for each l = l, ..., dv. Let δ be a positive real number, and let cS = aS − bSδ for
all S ⊆ Ui for i = 1, ..., d.
R : maximize g(x) =
∑
i
∑
S⊆Ui
cS
∏
s∈S
xis subject to 1
Tx = l.
Let h(δ) be the optimal value of problem R for some δ, i.e., h(δ) = maxx{g(x) :
1Tx = l}. Note that we do not have to find the optimum value δ∗ of problem
Q, since our goal is to determine whether v maximizes its value, that is, l δ∗ >
dvf(1) or not. All we have to do is to solve R for δ
′ = dvl f(1), and determine
whether h(δ′) < 0 or not.
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For converting g(x) in problem R to linear function, let yi,t denote the 0/1
variable and let ei,t be the constant for 1 ≤ i ≤ d and 1 ≤ t ≤ |Ui| such that,
yi,t =
{
1
∑
s∈Ui x
i
s = t
0 otherwise
, ei,t = max
S
∑
T⊆S
cT : S ⊆ Ui, |S| = t
 .
yi,t indicates whether the number of edges used in the strategy x going from v
to Ui is equal to t or not. If yi,t = 1, let S ⊆ Ui be the t edges chosen. Then
we consider that g(x) earns
∑
T⊆S cT , with cost t. In the optimal strategy x,
if yi,t = 1 for some i, t then it must be that S maximizes
∑
T⊆S cT , that is ei,t,
as any other assignment can be improved to it. We then have the equivalent
integer linear program to R:
R′ : maximize
d∑
i=1
|Ui|∑
t=1
ei,t yi,t subject to
d∑
i=1
|Ui|∑
t=1
t yi,t = l (10)
|Ui|∑
t=1
yi,t ≤ 1 for i=1, ..., d. (11)
Problem R′ is similar to a knapsack problem where each item has positive integer
weight t and value ei,t, and the total weight must be l. The only difference is
the constraint (11).
Dynamic programming can be used to solve R′ in O(ldv) time. Let w(i, t),
for 1 ≤ i ≤ d and 1 ≤ t ≤ l, denote the maximum value which has total weight
t and uses only the i first items. Let ei,0 = 0, then,
w(i, t) = max
0≤s≤|Ui|
{w(i− 1, t− s) + ei,s}.
For each i = 1, ..., d, we can compute w(i, t) for 1 ≤ t ≤ l in l|Ui| time. Since
dv =
∑
1≤i≤d |Ui|, the computation time for solving R′ is O(ldv).
In order to determine whether v is in best response, we test g(x) for δ =
dv
1 δ
′, dv2 δ
′, ..., dvdv δ
′. Since dv ≤ kd the running time per vertex is O(2kn3+k2d3+
2kd). Moreover
∑
v∈V dv < 2kn from the assumption. Therefore, in order to
determine whether every node is in best response, it takes O(2kn4 + k2n3 +
2kn) = O(2kn4) time. This completes the proof of Theorem 3.2.
4 Request-Delete Model
In this section, we study the request-delete-model for undirected PageRank
games, where not only a player v can unilaterally delete bidirected links, but
also v can create outlinks from v to any non-neighbours. We may consider
these outlinks to be a form of requests to the other node to establish a link.
We consider the problem of determining whether the given input is a Nash
equilibrium in the request-delete-model or not. We give an O(n3) time algorithm
for this when the underlying graph G is a bidirected tree.
Let G be a tree and v be a node in G. Let Γ(v) denote the set of neighbours
of v and let dv = |Γ(v)|. For i ∈ Γ(v), let Ni be the set of nodes which
are descendants of i (including i itself) in the subtree of G rooted at v. In
11
the request-delete-model, a player v is in best response if any combination of
edge deletions and creation of outlinks cannot increase PageRank of v. A Nash
equilibrium is a graph for which every player is in best response. A strategy
for v is to retain a subset Ev ⊆ Γ(v) of neighbours and to choose a subset
Fv ⊆ V −Γ(v) for outlinks to her non-neighbours. Let x and y be a 0/1 vectors
of length dv = |Γ(v)| and of length |V − Γ(v)| = n − dv respectively which
indicate v’s strategy. Formally, for i ∈ Γ(v), xi = 1 if i is in Ev otherwise
xi = 0. Similarly, for u ∈ V − Γ(v), yu = 1 if u is in Fv otherwise yu = 0. Let
piv(x,y) be the PageRank of v on the resulting graph for the strategy Ev and
Fv. A node v is in best response if piv(1,0) ≥ piv(x,y) for any 0/1 vectors x
and y. Our approach to solve the problem for verifying a Nash equilibrium is
to compute the maximum of piv(x,y) over all 0/1 vectors x,y, for each vertex
v.
Since G is a tree and the outlinks of v do not affect φuv for any u ∈ V ,
equation (4) holds. By equation (2), the PageRank of v can be written as:
piv(x,y) = (1
Tx+ 1Ty)
∑
i∈Γ(v) aixi∑
i∈Γ(v)
(
(1− ci)xi +
∑
u∈N(i)−{i} (1− euxi) yu
) . (12)
where we let a = (ai), c = (ci) and e = (eu) be constants such that
ai = α
∑
u∈Ni
quφuv, ci = (1− α)φiv for i ∈ Γ(v).
eu = (1− α)φuv for u ∈ V − Γ(v).
The proof of the following lemma can be found in [6].
Lemma 4.1 [6] Let D be a directed graph. For a node v in D, if a node u 6= v
has the maximum potential with respect to v then u is a in-neighbour of v.
We prove following two lemmas.
Lemma 4.2 Let G be a tree, v be a node in G, and let Ni be defined as above.
For all i ∈ Γ(v) and for all u ∈ N(i)− {i},
φiv > φuv.
Proof. Let T be the subtree of G induced by v and all nodes in Ni. Since G is
a tree, the walk starting at the nodes in Ni cannot reach the nodes in V −Ni
without visiting v. Thus the potential from each vertex u ∈ T with respect to
v is the same as the potential in G. By Lemma 4.1, only a neighbour of v can
have the maximum potential to v in T and the other potentials are strictly less.
This means φiv > φuv for all u ∈ N(i) in G and concludes the proof.
By Lemma 4.2, we have the following strict inequality.
ci > eu for u ∈ Ni, for i ∈ Γ(v). (13)
Let yˆl denote a 0/1 vector over V − Γ(v) such that yˆlu = 1 if eu is within
the lth largest values in the all entries of e, and yˆlu = 0 otherwise.
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Lemma 4.3 Let piv(x,y) and yˆ
l be defined as above. For l = 1, ..., n,
max
x,y
{ piv(x,y) | 1Tx+ 1Ty = l }
= max
x
1≤l1≤dv
0≤l2≤n−dv
{ piv(x, yˆl2) | 1Tx = l1, l1 + l2 = l }.
Proof. By contradiction. When y = 0 and y = 1, obviously the above equation
holds, so we consider the case of y 6= 0,1.
Assume that (x∗,y∗) is the maximum assignment for piv(x,y) subject to
1Tx+ 1Ty = l, and that y∗ 6= yˆl2 for any 1 ≤ l2 ≤ n− dv − 1. There exist u,w
in V − Γ(v) such that eu > ew and y∗u = 0, y∗w = 1. Let i denote the neighbour
of v such that u is in Ni.
When the case of x∗i = 1, the assignment y
∗
u = 1, y
∗
w = 0 decreases the de-
nominator in the equation (12), since 1−eu < 1−ew. This gives an improvement
for piv(x,y), and does not change the Hamming weights of x and y, a contra-
diction. Therefore we take x∗i = 0. However the assignment x
∗
i = 1, y
∗
w = 0
decreases the denominator in the equation (12), since 1− ci < 1− eu < 1− ew
by (13). This gives an improvement, and does not change the value 1Tx+1Ty.
This contradiction concludes the proof.
Lemma 4.3 means that if a player v is in best response, v puts her outlinks
to the nodes which have the higher potential to v.
Theorem 4.4 Given a bidirected tree G, jump probability α and distribution
q, we can determine in O(n3) time whether this is a Nash equilibrium in the
request-delete-model and if not give an improving strategy for at least one player.
Proof. Consider the following fractional integer programming problem:
P ′ : maximize piv(x,y) x ∈ {0, 1}dv , y ∈ {0, 1}n−dv .
We solve optimization problem P ′ for each v in V . For given v and each l2 =
0, ..., n − dv, we compute yˆl2 as defined just before Lemma 4.3. Consider the
following 0/1 optimization problem Q′ for l1 = 1, ..., dv.
Q′ : maximize f(x) =
aTx
bTx
. subject to 1Tx = l1
where bi = ((1 − ci) +
∑
u∈N(i)−{i}(1 − eu)yˆl2u ) for i ∈ Γ(v). By using the
algorithm to solve the problem Q in Section 3.1, we can solve problem Q′ for
all l1 = 1, ..., dv in O(d
2
v) time. Let l = l1 + l2. By Lemma 4.3, the solution to
problem Q′ for each l = 1, ..., n gives also the solution to P ′ since piv(x, yˆl2) =
(l1 + l2)f(x). Thus, for each node v in V , we can determine whether v is in
best response. It follows that we can determine whether the input is a Nash
equilibrium.
Finally, we analyze the running time of the algorithm. It takes O(n2) time
to compute all potentials in G. For each l2 = 0, 1, ..., n − dv, it takes O(d2v)
times to solve the problem Q′. Therefore we can determine if a node v is in best
response in O
(
(n− dv) d2v
)
time. Since G is a tree,
∑
v∈V dv = O(n). Thus we
can test whether all nodes are in best response in O(n3) time.
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5 Add-Delete Model
In this section, we introduce the add-delete-model, where each player v can
delete any edges from v and can add one edge to any non-neighbour u if by so
doing the PageRank of u increases. Otherwise we may presume that u would
simply delete the edge (u, v). We consider the problem of determining whether
or not the input is a Nash equilibrium and give an O(22kn5) time algorithm
for general graphs, where k is the maximum vertex degree on any biconnected
component in the graph.
Let G = (V,E) be an undirected graph and let k = k(G) be a parameter
defined as follows. If G = (V,E) is a tree we set k = 1 else k is the maximum
vertex degree in any biconnected component of G. Let Γ(v) denote the set of
neighbors of a node v in G. Let dv = |Γ(v)|. In the add-delete-model, the
strategy for a player v is to retain the subset of neighbours from Γ(v) and to
choose one non-neighbour u to add an edge between u and v. The PageRank
of u must increase by the strategy. A player v is in best response if v cannot
increase her PageRank by her any other possible strategies. A Nash equilibrium
is a graph where every player is in best response.
Let v be a node in G and let {C1, C2, ..., Cd} be the set of connected compo-
nents in the subgraph that are induced by deletion of v from G. It follows from
the definition of k = k(G) that v has at most k links to Ci for i = 1, ..., d. Let
Ui = {u : u ∈ Ci, u ∈ Γ(v)} be the set of v’s neighbours in Ci for i = 1, ..., d.
Let x be a 0/1 vector of length |Γ(v)| which indicates the strategy of v for edge
deletion. We write x = (x1, x2, ..., xd) as the concatenation of the 0/1 vectors
xi representing the strategy restricted to the component Ci for i = 1, ..., d. The
potential φwv(x) on G is given by equation (6) for each w in V .
Theorem 5.1 Given a graph G with k = k(G), jump probability α and dis-
tribution q, in O(22kn5) time we can determine if this is a Nash Equilibrium
in the add-delete-model and if not give an improving strategy for at least one
player.
Proof. We give an algorithm which determines whether a player v in best
response, for each vertex v in V .
We fix v and for each of v′s non-neighbours u perform the following steps. Let
Cj be the component containing u. We initially decide the strategy vector x
j for
Cj by choosing a subset U
′
j ⊆ Uj . Let G′ be the graph formed by adding (u, v) to
G and by deleting the edges to nodes not in U ′j . Otherwise we retain the edges to
the nodes in Ui, for each i = 1, ...d, i 6= j. Let x−j = (x1, ..., xj−1, xj+1, ..., xd).
For each node w in Cj , let φ
G′
wv be the potential calculated on G
′. Since v is
a cut vertex of G′, these potentials are invariant to x−j . By equation (2), v’s
PageRank on the resulting graph for the strategy x−j on G′ can be written as
follows:
piG
′
v (x
−j) = (1Tx−j + |U ′j |)
a0 +
∑
i 6=j
∑
S⊆Ui aS
∏
s∈S x
i
s
b0 +
∑
i6=j
∑
S⊆Ui bS
∏
s∈S xis
(14)
where aS , bS are defined by equation (8) and (9), and a0 = α
∑
w∈Cj qwφ
G′
wv and
b0 = |U ′j | − (1− α)
∑
w∈U ′j φ
G′
wv are known constants. We consider the following
problem.
P ′′ : maximize piG
′
v (x
−j) subject to piG
′
u (x
−j) > piGu
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In order to determine whether v maximizes its PageRank, we fix the Hamming
weight l of x−j for each l = 1, ..., |Γ(v)|−|U ′j | and consider the following problem
Q′′.
Q′′ : maximize
a0 +
∑
i6=j
∑
S⊆Ui aS
∏
s∈S x
i
s
b0 +
∑
i 6=j
∑
S⊆Ui bS
∏
s∈S xis
subject to 1Tx−j = l (15)
piG
′
u (x
−j) > piGu .(16)
According to the PageRank formulae for each w in Cj ,
piG
′
w (x
−j) = αqw +
∑
w′∈Γ(w)
piG
′
w′ (x
−j)
|Γ(w′)| .
Since the nodes in Cj are not adjacent to the nodes in Ci for each i = 1, ..., d,
i 6= j, we can calculate the PageRank of u as follows.
piG
′
u (x
−j) = ζu + ηu
piG
′
v (x
−j)
1Tx−j + |U ′v|
where ζu and ηu are positive constants. Thus the constraint (16) in the problem
Q′′ is piG
′
v (x
−j) > l+|U
′
v|
ηu
(piGu − ζu). Since our goal is to maximize piG
′
v (x
−j), we
can ignore the constraint (16) during the maximization. Let δ∗ be the optimal
value of problem Q′′ without the constraint (16). Player v is not in best response
if piGv /(l+ |U ′v|) < δ∗ and l+|U
′
v|
ηu
(piGu −ζu) ≤ δ∗. We can test these inequalities by
the algorithm for problem Q in Section 3.2. This means that we can determine
if v is in best response or not.
Finally, we analyze the running time of the algorithm. For each non-neighbour
u of v and for each subset U ′j of Uj , it takes O(n
3) time to compute the po-
tential φG
′
wv for each w in Cj . It takes O(2
kn3) time for problem Q′′ for each
l = 1, ..., |Γ(v)| − |U ′j |. Therefore it takes O(22kn4) time per vertex and so we
can determine if the input is a Nash equilibrium or not in O(22kn5) time.
5.1 α-insensitive equilibria
We prove that G is an α-insensitive equilibrium in the add-delete-model if and
only if G is a complete graph using the following lemma.
Lemma 5.2 If an undirected graph G is connected, for non-neighbours u, v in
V there exists α0 such that for all 0 < α ≤ α0,
piG
′
v > pi
G
v , pi
G′
u ≥ piGu
where G′ = (V,E ∪ (u, v)).
Proof. Recall that the stationary distribution in a standard random walk on a
connected undirected graph is proportional to the degree of each vertex. In an
α-random walk, when we have α→ 0, piGv converges to dv/d′ and piG
′
v converges
to (dv + 1)/(d
′ + 2) > dv/d′, where d′ =
∑
v∈V dv and so d
′ > 2dv. By the
continuity of piv for α ∈ (0, 1) [3], there exists α0 such that piG′v > piGv and
piG
′
u > pi
G
u for all 0 < α ≤ α0. This concludes the proof.
An undirected graph G is called an α-insensitive equilibrium if G is an
equilibrium for all 0 < α < 1.
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Theorem 5.3 If an undirected graph G is connected, G is an α-insensitive
equilibrium in the add-delete-model if and only if G is a complete graph.
Proof. Assume that G is an α-insensitive equilibrium and is not a complete
graph, and thus G has at least one non-neighbours of (u, v). By Lemma 5.2,
there exists α0 such that for α < α0, the edge addition (u, v) must increase the
PageRank of both piu and piv. This contradicts that G is an equilibrium.
Conversely, assume that G is a complete graph. There does not exist a
non-neighbour in G. G is a Nash equilibrium in the directed PageRank game
since each node is in best response (see Section 2.2). Therefore any deletion of
undirected edges for a node v does not improve her PageRank for any α. This
means G is an α-insensitive equilibrium in the add-delete-model.
One may wonder if there are α-sensitive equilibrium in the add-delete-model
which are connected and are not complete graphs. We do not know the answer
to this question even if we assume q is a uniform distribution. However, we
have found some α-sensitive equilibria in the add-delete-model without deletions
allowed. That is, we allow single edge additions that raise the PageRank of
both endpoints but we do not allow deletions. In the case of non-uniform q we
have found many examples of α-sensitive equilibria. For uniform q we have the
following examples.
31
G1
2
Km1 Km2
4
21
G2
43Km1 Km2 Km3
Figure 6: α-sensitive equilibria: add-delete-without deletions, uniform q
Figure 6 shows two graphs G1 and G2 which are examples of α-sensitive
equilibria in the no-deletion add-delete-model with uniform q, whereKm denotes
the complete graph of size m. In G1, there are three possible choices for an edge
addition which are: (i) 1,3, (ii) 1,4 and (iii) 2,4. For example, take m1 = 50,
m2 = 2 and α = 0.15. Case (i) decreases PageRank of node 1, case (ii) decreases
PageRank of node 1 and case (iii) decreases PageRank of node 2. Therefore G1 is
an equilibrium for α = 0.15. While we take α = 0.02, any of these cases increase
the PageRanks of the two endpoints. Therefore G1 is not an equilibrium for
α = 0.02. It follows that G1 is an α-sensitive equilibrium. The graph G2 is also
an α-sensitive equilibrium for m1 = 10000, m2 = 100, m3 = 2 and α = 0.15. We
remark that these are not equilibria if deletions are allowed. In G1 the deletion
of (1, 3) improves the PageRank of node 3. Similarly in G3, the deletion of (3, 4)
improves the PageRank of node 4.
5.2 A Sufficient Condition for Edge Addition
Throughout this section, we assume that the distribution vector q is uniform,
i.e., qv = 1/n for all v ∈ V . We show that if G is symmetric with respect to
non-neighbours u, v in G, then an edge addition between u, v must increase the
16
PageRank of both u and v. An automorphism mapping on G is a permutation
σ over the vertices such that (σ(u), σ(v)) ∈ E if and only if (u, v) ∈ E. Let
Aut(G) be a set of automorphisms on G.
Theorem 5.4 If an undirected graph G has non-neighbours u, v and has a graph
automorphism σ ∈ Aut(G) such that σ(v) = u and σ(u) = v, then
piG
′
v > pi
G
v , pi
G′
u > pi
G
u
where G′ = (V,E ∪ (u, v)).
Proof. Let zij be the expected number of times in which an α-random walk
visits j before the first jump when the walk starts at i.
zij = E
[
J−1∑
t=0
I {Xt = j}
∣∣∣∣∣X0 = i
]
where J ≥ 1 is the time of the first jump and I{Xt = j} denotes the indicator
for the tth step of α-random walk visiting j. Since the mapping σ preserves
adjacency of all neighbours in G, we have zij = zσ(i)σ(j) for all i, j ∈ V . Since
q is the uniform distribution,
piGv =
α
n
∑
w∈V
zw,v
=
α
n
∑
w∈V
zσ(w),σ(v)
=
α
n
∑
w∈σ(V )
zw,u
=
α
n
∑
w∈V
zw,u = pi
G
u .
Similarly, (σ (u) , σ (v)) = (v, u) is in G′, so the mapping σ is in Aut(G′). Hence
we have piG
′
v = pi
G′
u .
For a node w in V , let zw[uv] denote the expected number of times in which
the walk visits u and v when the walk starts at w before a random jump. By
the linearity of expectations,
zw[uv] = E
[
J−1∑
t=0
(I {Xt = u}+ I {Xt = v})
∣∣∣∣∣X0 = w
]
= E
[
J−1∑
t=0
I{Xt = u}
∣∣∣∣∣X0 = w
]
+ E
[
J−1∑
t=0
I{Xt = v}
∣∣∣∣∣X0 = w
]
= zwu + zwv.
Let piG[uv] denote the sum of PageRank of u and v on G. Then we have,
piG[uv] = pi
G
v + pi
G
u
=
α
n
∑
w∈V
(zwu + zwv) =
α
n
∑
w∈V
zw[uv].
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We compute the expected number of visits to u and v when the walk starts
at w. Firstly we compute the probability that the walk reaches u or v and
consider the expected number of walks revisiting u and v. We have zw[uv] =
φw[uv]z[uv][uv], where φw[uv] is the probability that a walk starting from w reaches
u or v before the first jump. The term z[uv][uv] counts the number of returns
from u ∪ v to u ∪ v before the first jump occurs.
z[uv][uv] = E
[
J−1∑
t=0
I{Xt = u ∪Xt = v}
∣∣∣∣∣X0 = u ∪X0 = v
]
.
Each return succeeds with probability φ+[uv][uv], where φ
+
[uv][uv] is the probability
of the walk returning from u ∪ v to u ∪ v before the first jump. Hence we have
z[uv][uv] = 1 + φ
+
[uv][uv] + (φ
+
[uv][uv])
2 + · · · = 1
1− φ+[uv][uv]
.
Since we have σ(v) = u, σ(u) = v and qv = qu = 1/n,
φ+[uv][uv] = φ
+
u[uv] = φ
+
v[uv] =
(1− α)
|Γ(v)|
∑
i∈Γ(v)
φi[uv]. (17)
Now we conclude the theorem. If we add a new edge between u and v to
G, the right-hand in (17) becomes strictly larger than the before, because we
have φv[uv] = 1. By equation(17), this means that pi
G′
[uv] > pi
G
[uv]. We also have
pi[uv] = piu + piv = 2piu = 2piv. This concludes the proof.
6 Conclusion
We have constructed three different models for PageRank games on undirected
web graphs and studied the problem of verifying Nash equilibria in each model.
The algorithms obtained have high complexity and are thus useable only on
small scale networks, or on a small fragment of a much larger network as an
approximation. From the algorithmic side, the main open question is whether
polynomial time algorithms exist for checking Nash equilibria in general graphs.
Other results in this paper concern the evolution of PageRank graphs if
players act unilaterally to improve their page rank. We showed in Theorem
5.3 that complete graphs are the only α-insensitive equilibria in the add-delete-
model. It would clearly spell doom for any social network if this happened! Are
there any non-α-insensitive equilibria?
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